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I. INTRODUCTION
Yemen is currently experiencing one of the largest starvation crises
in modern history.1 About two-thirds of Yemen’s population struggle
for access to food and drinkable water.2 The lack of access led to
severe cholera outbreaks from contaminated water and food, and at its
peak resulted in ten thousand cases per week.3
The starvation crisis primarily stems from Yemen’s internal armed
conflict beginning in 2014, when the Houthi rebels stormed into
Yemen’s capital and conquered it.4 Backed by members of the army
of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, the Houthis drove out the
internationally recognized Yemeni government into Saudi Arabia.5 By
March 2015, Saudi Arabia intervened on behalf of Yemen’s
government, primarily through airstrikes.6 Dozens of these airstrikes
1. See UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [UNOCHA]:
UN Country Team in Yemen, Yemen: 2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview, at 7
(Dec.
2018),
https://yemen.un.org/sites/default/files/201908/2019_Yemen_HNO_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter UNOCHA Yemen] (explaining the
context of Yemen’s food crisis).
2. See id. at 4 (describing that about ten million people in Yemen are food
insecure, making it the largest man-made humanitarian crisis).
3. Yemen Cholera Outbreak is Worst in World with WHO Now Recording
10,000
Cases
Per
Week,
REUTERS
(Oct.
3,
2018),
https://www.newsweek.com/yemen-cholera-outbreak-worst-world-10000-caseswho-1149984.
4. See Marcel Serr, Understanding the War in Yemen, 11 ISR. J. FOREIGN AFF.
357, 364 (2017) (detailing the series of conflicts, events, and geo-politics that lead
to the conflict as it existed when the article was published).
5. See id. at 358–59, 363 (recounting the “Arab Spring” movement in Yemen
and its impacts).
6. See YEMEN DATA PROJECT, Collating and Disseminating Data on the
Conduct of the War in Yemen with the Purpose of Increasing Transparency and
Promoting Accountability, http://yemendataproject.org/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2021)
(The Yemen Data Project tracks the conduct of war in Yemen, including information
the location, authority, and casualties of aerial bombardments) (reporting that the
Saudi Arabian led coalition has performed more than twenty thousand air raids in
over 2000 days).
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hit critical supplies of food and water, a condition that worsened
through a blockade preventing humanitarian aid.7 Suffering increased
as multiple internal conflicts sprang up in the State, including a selfdetermination movement in the south and the incursion of Al-Qaeda.8
Many international groups condemned the airstrikes and Yemen’s
starvation crisis as violating international humanitarian law under
Protocol II.9 Protocol II establishes laws that State parties must follow
during non-international armed conflicts.10 Within the Protocol,
Article 14 prohibits the use of starvation as a method of warfare via
attacks against objects indispensable to the survival of a civilian
7. Data:
Airwar,
YEMEN
DATA
PROJECT,
https://yemendataproject.org/data.html (click ‘to download the full database click
here’ under the section “Airwar”) (last visited Sept. 20, 2020) (counting each
individual airstrike and categorizing the type of target and the number of casualties).
8. See Yemen: What is the Southern Transitional Council?, AL JAZEERA (Apr.
26, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/yemen-southern-transitionalcouncil-200426072715154.html (explaining that the Southern Transitional Council
(STC) began as an independence movement for southern Yemen in 2017, backed by
the United Arab Emirates (UAE)); Steven A. Cook, America is Not an Innocent
Bystander
in
Yemen,
FOREIGN
POL’Y
(Sept.
26,
2018),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/27/america-is-not-an-innocent-bystander-inyemen/ (discussing how foreign involvement in Yemen increased as the United
States and others engaged to fight Al Qaeda).
9. See U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights
[UNOHCHR], Yemen: United Nations Experts Point to Possible War Crimes by
Parties
to
the
Conflict,
(Aug.
28,
2018),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23479
(outlining the standards of international humanitarian law that creates obligations
for the parties to the non-international armed conflict in Yemen); see also NARIS
KHAN, ISLAMIC HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, VIOLATING WITH IMPUNITY: SAUDI
WAR CRIMES IN YEMEN 12–14 (2016) (providing a brief legal analysis with
international legal principles and violations committed by Saudi Arabia). But see
Merrit Kennedy, U.S. Stands by Saudi Arabia, Despite Criticism Over Civilian
Casualties
in
Yemen,
NPR
(Sept.
12,
2018,
4:50
PM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/09/12/647044729/u-s-stands-by-saudi-despite-criticismover-civilian-casualties-in-yemen (showing that the U.S. solidified its allegiance to
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in a letter by Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo to Congress). See generally Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S 609 [hereinafter Protocol
II] (outlining the standards of international humanitarian law activities in Yemen
will be held to).
10. Protocol II, supra note 9, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 615; see discussion infra Part
II(B).
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population.11 While international humanitarian law serves primarily to
protect individuals, this provision is one of only a handful that protects
water resources, particularly within the more limited protections under
non-international armed conflicts.12
This Comment argues that Saudi Arabia violated Article 14 of
Protocol II, as a party of the Protocol, when it attacked water resources
for the purpose of starving civilians in Yemen.
Part II of this Comment provides the historical context of Yemen’s
internal armed conflict, explores the legal background of Protocol II
and Article 14, and discloses defenses underlying this Article.13 Part
III applies the facts from Part II to analyze Yemen’s internal armed
conflict and the Saudi-led attacks to break down whether Saudi Arabia
violated Protocol II.14 Part IV suggests recommendations to remedy
the situation.15 Part V concludes.16

II. BACKGROUND
The background provides information on Yemen’s internal armed
conflict and the international humanitarian law that prohibits Saudi
Arabia from using starvation as a method of warfare. It discusses how
Saudi Arabia became involved in Yemen’s civil war, its means of
attack in airstrikes, and justifications. Further, it explains the
humanitarian crisis in Yemen. Additionally, this section introduces
Protocol II Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which
governs non-international armed conflicts. It then focuses on Article
14 of Protocol II. This discussion applies a criminal law framework to
11. Protocol II, supra note 9, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 615; see discussion infra Part
II(B)(2).
12. See Water and Armed Conflicts, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS,
https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/water-and-armed-conflicts (last visited Feb.
14, 2021) (describing the protections for water in armed conflicts, and specifying
the four main prohibitions in the law: ban on employing poison or poisonous
weapons; ban on destroying, confiscating, or expropriating property; ban on
destroying objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population; and the
ban on attacking works or installations containing dangerous forces – the last two of
which apply to non-international armed conflicts).
13. See discussion infra Part II.
14. See discussion infra Part III.
15. See discussion infra Part IV.
16. See discussion infra Part V.
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breakdown the acts and intent necessary to constitute a violation and
how particular defenses can or cannot be used under this Article.

A. AN OVERVIEW OF YEMEN’S ARMED CONFLICT
While Yemen experiences several internal armed conflicts,
including southern self-determination and terrorism, the following
section centers on the relevant facts and parties to Yemen’s armed
conflict between the internationally recognized government and the
Houthis. Then, it focuses on Saudi Arabia and its coalition’s airstrikes
by examining what targets it strikes, particularly water resources in
Yemen. Additionally, the section discusses the starvation crisis in
Yemen through deprivation of water and cholera outbreaks.
i

Yemen’s Internal Armed Conflict and Saudi Arabia Coalition
Airstrikes

In 2015, the Houthi rebel group, supported by weapons and
financing by Iran, ran the Yemeni government out of the country and
into Saudi Arabia after capturing the capital city and inserting a
shadow government.17 The rebellion grew in such strength that
Yemeni leader Abd Rabbu-Mansour Hadi requested military support
from Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait,
and Qatar.18 In response, Saudi Arabia led a coalition to support
President Hadi with his consent as the internationally recognized
leader of the Yemen government and launched attacks over Houthicontrolled territory.19 Over the following four to five years, Saudi
Arabia targeted Yemen using about 20,000 airstrikes, caused over
8,500 civilian deaths, and attacked over 6,500 known non-military
17. See Serr, supra note 4, at 358 (explaining that in 2015 the Houthis seized the
presidential palace, placed President Hadi under house arrest, but he eventually
escaped and declared that the Houthis staged a coup with help of security services
that favored the former President Ali Abdullah Saleh).
18. See Permanent Rep. of Qatar to the U.N. Security Council [UNSC], Identical
letters dated 26 March 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/217 (Mar. 27, 2015) (requesting support in the name of
international and regional peace and security).
19. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, YEMEN: EVENTS OF 2018 (2019) (adding that
the U.S. also supported the coalition with intelligence, air refueling, and selling
weapons).
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targets.20 Specifically, the coalition airstrikes attacked farmland, water
supplies like wells and water tanks, and water facilities and projects.21
Particularly, half of the attacks on water resources occurred in two
governates, Saada and Hudaydah, which are primary conflict zones. 22
About two-third of these attacks occurred in five governates: Saada,
Hudaydah, Taiz, Hajja, and Sanaa.23 Saudi Arabia justifies its
airstrikes continuously targeting civilians by designating them as
accidents, military objectives, or denying the existence of the strike.24
ii The Starvation Crisis
The starvation crisis stems from several causes and developed into
one of the worst known humanitarian crises.25 States, including Saudi
Arabia, periodically set up naval blockades preventing humanitarian
aid from key ports.26 The airstrikes hit hundreds of critical water
20. See YEMEN DATA PROJECT, supra note 6 (showing infographics in which the
total number of civilian’s injured and killed is over 18,000).
21. See Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in Yemen, Including
Violations and Abuses Since September 2014: Report of the Detailed Findings of the
Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen, ¶¶ 46 51,
A/HRC.42/CRP.1 (Sept. 3, 2019) [hereinafter HRC Detailed Findings Report]
(analyzing international humanitarian law violations generally from all parties to the
conflict, analyzing the categorization of the conflict as non-international, and
developing the legal basis for responsibility of each party, including Saudi Arabia).
22. Data: Airwar, supra note 7 (sorting attacks by the governate that the airstrike
occurred within, and then eliminating all but those strikes on water resources).
23. Id. (categorizing data on airstrikes by the governate that was attacked).
24. See Stephanie Nebehay, Saudi Arabia Admits Coalition ‘Mistakes’ in
Targeting in Yemen, REUTERS (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/usyemen-security-saudi-children-idUSKCN1MB3O4 (expressing Saudi Arabia’s
assertion that it held violators accountable, had a list of off-limit targets in Yemen,
and excused hitting those targets because Houthi rebels used them as refuges, while
admitting it violation rules of engagement on at least one occasion).
25. See Yuliya Talmazan, Yemen Crisis: Three Stats that Reveal the Scale of
World’s Worst Humanitarian Crisis, NBC NEWS (Oct. 28, 2018),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/yemen-crisis-three-stats-reveal-scaleworld-s-worst-humanitarian-n923741 (showing that the number of cholera deaths of
children at the time was over 50,000, one million people had cholera, and Yemeni
children had lived through 18,000 airstrikes at that point); Humanitarian Crisis in
Yemen Remains the Worst in the World, Warns UN, UN NEWS (Feb. 14, 2019),
https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/02/1032811 (approximately eighty-percent of
Yemen’s population about twenty-four million people need assistance and
protection).
26. See Yemen: Coalition Blockade Imperils Civilians, HRW (Dec. 7, 2017),
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resources: water tanks and trucks, water drillers, water projects, water
desalination or sewage plants, water pumps, wells, and water
factories.27 The attacks on water infrastructure led to massive cholera
outbreaks killing thousands, many of which were children.28 About
twenty million people of the State of Yemen are deprived of critical
food, water, and sanitation necessary for survival.29 For example,
attacks on water in Taiz City put 400,000 people at risk by depriving
them of safe drinking water.30 Governates such as Saada, Hudaydah,
Taiz, and Hajja have been in states of emergency regarding starvation
since 2017.31 Sanaa and other more inland governates have also been
at a critical level approaching emergency since then.32 The
international community has called for humanitarian pauses of the
violence to give people necessary aid, to no avail, and demanded
accountability for the starvation crisis numerous times since the start
of the conflict.33

B. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II
The following section will discuss the parameters of Protocol II: the
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/07/yemen-coalition-blockade-imperilscivilians# (describing the blockade’s restriction of food, fuel, and medicine in the
poorest country in the Middle East).
27. See Data: Airwar, supra note 7.
28. See JEREMY M. SHARP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IN10729, YEMEN:
CHOLERA OUTBREAK 1 3 (2017) (setting out the United States’ assessment of the
cholera outbreak and asserting that, as of August 1, 2017, 1,900 people have died of
cholera, 80% of whom are children and elderly people).
29. See Yemen, WFP, https://www.wfp.org/countries/yemen (last visited Sept.
23, 2020) (claiming that, without food assistance, the number of people facing
hunger would be over twenty million).
30. See SHARP, supra note 27, at 3 (expressing the U.S. and U.N. joint call for
rehabilitation of the water system in Ta’iz City).
31. See Mapping the Yemen Conflict, EUR. COUNCIL FOREIGN REL.,
https://www.ecfr.eu/mena/yemen (last updated July 2019) (displaying infographic
titled Food insecurity’ from February 2017 and categorizing based on stressed,
critical level, or emergency level of insecurity).
32. See id. (displaying Food insecurity’ infographic, which shows the Western
governates around Yemen’s borders are almost entirely at an emergency level ,
while the northwestern inland area was at a crisis level as of February 2017).
33. See Jane Ferguson, Is Intentional Starvation the Future of War?, NEW
YORKER (July 11, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/is-yemenintentional-starvation-the-future-of-war ( The Saudis have ignored pleas from every
humanitarian organization operating in Yemen to halt the offensive on Hodeidah. ).
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requirement of a non-international armed conflict and how States are
responsible. Additionally, the section will focus on Article 14, which
prohibits the use of starvation as a method of warfare by attacking
objects indispensable to the survival of a civilian population. This
section will discuss the elements of Article 14 using a criminal law
framework, namely actus reus and mens rea and an analogous case
example to create a specific and clear understanding of how a State
violates Article 14. Meeting these criteria demonstrates a violation of
Article 14 of Protocol II.
i. Scope of Protocol II: Non-International Armed Conflict and State
Responsibility
To better protect victims in conflicts based within a State, States
came together in 1977 and put into force the Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims in Non-International Armed Conflicts, also
known as Protocol II.34 The Protocol applies only to non-international
armed conflicts, and a similar treaty exists for international armed
conflicts, known as Protocol I.35 For a State to be responsible for
violations under Protocol II, the State must meet a series of criteria
listed in Article 1: the conflict must occur within the territory of a party
to Protocol II, the responsible State must also be party to Protocol II,
the conflict must be non-international in nature, and the State must be
responsible for the action that violates the Protocol.36 Yemen became
a party to Protocol II in 1990,37 and Saudi Arabia did the same in
2001.38
34. See generally Protocol II, supra note 9, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611 17.
35. See generally Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I), art. 1, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S 3, 7 [hereinafter Protocol I]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August
12, 1949, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention
IV]; Protocol II, supra note 9, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611.
36. Protocol II, supra note 9, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611.
37. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and
relating to the protection of victims if non-international armed conflict (Protocol II):
Accession, Yemen, June 20, 1990, 1567 U.N.T.S. 309 [hereinafter Yemen
Accession].
38. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and
relating to the protection of victims if non-international armed conflict (Protocol II):
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Article 1 of Protocol II defines non-international armed conflicts as
between the armed forces of a party to Protocol II and a dissident or
organized armed group.39 An international armed conflict, defined in
Protocol I, is State against State armed conflict or a non-State group
fighting for self-determination against a State as a racist regime, alien
occupant, or colonial power.40 Conversely, Article I of Protocol II
specifies that “internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots,
isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar
nature” are not armed conflicts.41 Protocol II is unique in its definition
of non-international armed conflicts because it requires non-State
armed groups to have territorial control to carry out sustained military
operations.42
ii. The Central Case Categorizing Armed Conflicts: Tadić
The landmark case encapsulating the legal distinctions between
international, non-international armed conflicts, and internal
disturbances is Prosecutor v. Tadić, from the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).43 The ICTY is the first
tribunal created by the United Nations Security Council in 1993 to
prosecute individuals for widespread violations of international

Status
List,
SWITZ.
FEDERAL
DEPT.
FOREIGN
AFFS.
https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/internationallaw/internationale-vertraege/datenbank-staatsvertraege/detailansichtstaatsvertrag.ggst0_51.contract19770113.html?_charset_=UTF-8 (last updated
Nov. 27, 2017) [hereinafter Saudi Arabia Accession: Switzerland] (showing Saudi
Arabia deposited its accession to Protocol II on Nov. 28, 2001, which entered the
treaty into force for Saudi Arabia on May 28, 2002); see also Treaties, States Parties
and
Commentaries,
INT’L
COMM.
RED
CROSS,
https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStat
esParties&xp_treatySelected=475 (last visited Sept. 25, 2020) [hereinafter Saudi
Arabia Accession: ICRC].
39. Protocol II, supra note 9, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611.
40. See Protocol I, supra note 34, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 7; Geneva Convention IV,
supra note 34, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288; see also Protocol II, supra note 9, 1125 U.N.T.S.
at 611.
41. Protocol II, supra note 9, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611.
42. Id.
43. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
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humanitarian law within the former Yugoslavia.44 The first case came
out against Duko Tadić, charged with counts of several international
crimes: grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of laws
or customs of war, and crimes against humanity.45
One of the many procedural decisions during the trial included
the defense’s appeal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, in part,
because no internal or international armed conflict existed.46 In that
decision, the court analyzed whether an armed conflict existed in the
former Yugoslavia, bringing the case into the court’s jurisdiction, and
articulated definitions.47 Citing the Geneva Conventions and Protocols
I and II, the court confirmed that an international conflict occurs when
State armed forces resort to armed conflict.48
Additionally, the ICTY Trial Chamber, in its decision of the Tadić
case, analyzed when fighting within a State rises to the level of a noninternational armed conflict.49 The Trial Chamber set out a twopronged inquiry: whether there was sufficient fighting and whether the
non-State group was adequately organized.50 In this case, the Trial
Chamber looked at the continued involvement of U.N. Security
Council and the ongoing nature of the conflict in considering its nature
and scope.51 Clashes between opposing groups occurred on both sides
of the checkpoints dividing the parties and continued once the Bosnian
Serbs obtained territorial control and separation.52 In assessing the
organization of the party breaking away from the State, the Bosnian
Serbs, the ICTY assessed the determinable territorial control of the
group, its political organization, and the constitution of an organized
44. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶¶1–2
(Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997).
45. Id. ¶¶ 9, 17 (explaining that the crimes remained the same, but the
prosecution reorganized the charges and lowered the number of counts).
46. See Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, ¶ 2 (listing the three-pronged attack of the
defense’s appeal: illegal foundation of the International Tribunal; wrongful primacy
of the International Tribunal over national courts; and lack of jurisdiction ratione
materiae).
47. Id. ¶¶ 66–70.
48. Id. ¶70.
49. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, ¶¶ 561–68.
50. Id. ¶ 561–71.
51. Id. ¶ 564–67.
52. Id. ¶ 564–66.
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military force with a command structure.53
iii. State Responsibility: Nicaragua v. U.S. and ‘Co-Belligerents’
The Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua in 1986 (Nicaragua v. U.S.) from the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) demonstrated at what point a State’s
involvement in an armed conflict leads to its responsibility: the
effective control test.54 In the case, Nicaragua accused the United
States of direct responsibility for the alleged crimes of the rebels called
Contras.55 The ICJ decided that the United States did not have effective
control over rebels in Nicaragua by financing, organizing, training,
supplying, and equipping the Contras.56 As a result, the United States
could not be responsible for the Contras’ actions; it was only
responsible for its own actions in connection to the Contras because it
did not direct or enforce the acts perpetrated by the rebels.57
Alternatively, when attributing state responsibility to organized
non-State groups, Nicaragua v. U.S.’s effective control test often is in
competition with the broader overall control test from the Tadić case
in its Appeals Chamber.58 In this case, the ICTY did not decide on
whether a State was responsible, but it asserted that a State is
responsible for a non-State group when it coordinates or helps plan the
military operations of the group in addition to any equipping,
financing, or training.59
Additionally, while there is little in international humanitarian law
describing the criteria for when a State becomes a party to another
States’ non-international armed conflict, a United Nations’ expert
analysis of the Yemen conflict and an expert from the International
53. Id. ¶¶ 563–64.
54. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 115 (June 27).
55. Id. ¶ 1.
56. Id. ¶ 115.
57. Id. ¶ 115–16.
58. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 124–131 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (rejecting the “effective
control” test, propounded by the ICJ in Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27), in
favor of the “overall control” test in determining whether acts by a military or
paramilitary group may be attributed to a State).
59. Id. ¶ 131.
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Committee of the Red Cross have designated a point at which, similar
to the control tests described above, States or multinational forces
become “co-belligerents.”60 They assert that a State may become a
party of another State’s non-international armed conflict as a cobelligerent when it participates in military operations with the State
that is in a non-international armed conflict.61

C. COMPLIANCE WITH PROTOCOL II: A CRIMINAL LAW
FRAMEWORK
Violations of Article 14 of Protocol II require two elements which
can be easily described using a criminal law approach: actus reus and
mens rea. First, the section briefly explains Article 14 and the
application of the criminal law framework. Second, there will be a case
analysis of the partial awards case from the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims
Commission as an analogous case. Third, the section will define the
actus reus: attacks against objects indispensable for the survival of the
civilian populations. Finally, there will be a breakdown of factors
allowing for the inference of a State’s intent to use starvation as a
method of combat, the mens rea.
i. Article 14: Protection Against Starvation as a Method of Combat
Via Attacks on Objects Indispensable to a Civilian Population’s
Survival
While the practice of starving out combatants is acceptable under
international humanitarian law,62 it is also a common tactic to target
civilians using starvation.63 Starvation under Protocol II is defined as
60. See HRC Detailed Findings Report, supra note 20, ¶ 50; see also Tristan
Ferraro, The Applicability and Application of International Humanitarian Law to
Multinational Forces, 95 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 561, 584 (2014) (explaining that a
multinational force becomes a co-belligerent and party to the conflict when it assists
one of the parties to that armed conflict as an armed force).
61. See HRC Detailed Findings Report, supra note 20, ¶ 50; see also Ferraro,
supra note 59, at 584 (applying the concept of co-belligerents to multinational armed
forces).
62. See Esbjörn Rosenblad, Starvation as a Method of Warfare – Conditions for
Regulation by Convention, 7 INT’L LAW. 252, 253 (1973) (citing scholarship
declaring relative unanimity that starvation is acceptable against combatants).
63. See Beth Van Schaack, Siege Warfare and the Starvation of Civilians as a
Weapon of War and War Crime, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 4, 2016),
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“the action of subjecting people to famine, i.e. extreme and general
scarcity of food.”64 Article 14 is meant to prevent the use of starvation
as a method of war by designating the most common forms of attack
on objects necessary to prevent starvation.65 The provision is titled the
‘Protection of Objects Indispensable to the Survival of the Civilian
Population’ and specifies:
Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited. It is
therefore prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless, for
that purpose, objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population, such as food stuffs, agricultural areas for the production of
food stuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies
and irrigation works.66
The basic principles of proving violations of an international
crime stand true for State violations of treaties like Protocol II by
breaking down violations into clear elements.67 All international
crimes have two common elements: the criminal act – actus reus – and
a criminal intent – mens rea.68 This construct is particularly relevant
for violations of Article 14 of Protocol II because there is a specific
requirement of intent to use starvation as a method of warfare; this
raises the level of proof necessary to prove a violation of Article 14
beyond the act of an attack on objects indispensable to a civilian
population’s survival.69 The language of the provision inherently
https://www.justsecurity.org/29157/siege-warfare-starvation-civilians-war-crime/
(showing that starvation of civilians in war is not new or uncommon).
64. Sylvie-S. Junod, Commentary on the Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), in COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOL OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 1456
(Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987).
65. Id.
66. Protocol II, supra note 9, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 615.
67. See NINA H.B. JØRGENSEN, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 151–54 (2000) (arguing that it is logical to conflate the acts
of an individual under criminal law with the acts of the State because they act as
agents of the State and a State therefore must have an actus reus and mens rea for
the crime).
68. See Yoram Dinstein, International Criminal Law, 20 ISR. L. REV. 206, 233
(1975) (exploring the basic elements of international crimes).
69. Cf. BEATRICE I. BONAFÈ, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 2–5, 27–8 (2009)
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requires a separate legal analysis of the act, actus reus, and intent,
mens rea, to prove a State’s violation.70
ii. Example Case: Partial Award Case of the Eritrea-Ethiopia
Claims Commission
The following case demonstrates a rare direct example of when
attacks on a water resource violates the prohibition on using starvation
as a method of warfare In 2000, Eritrea and Ethiopia signed the Algiers
Agreement, ending about two years of hostilities between the two
States.71 Within the agreement came the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims
Commission, which created binding arbitration for claims coming out
of international law violations, including humanitarian law, the 1949
Geneva Conventions, and the Additional Protocol I.72 In April 2005,
the Claims Commission looked at claims that included an attack on a
water reservoir during Ethiopia’s aerial bombardment.73 The
Commission decided that the attack constituted a violation of the
language of Article 54 of Protocol I as part of customary international
law,74 the equivalent provision to Article 14 of Protocol II which
applies to international armed conflicts.75
Specifically, Ethiopia conducted several airstrikes on a water

(describing how under aggravated state responsibility, individual and state
responsibility are linked in their origins and with respect to specific international
crimes, including war crimes).
70. Cf. id. at 114–18 (demonstrating and discussing the interconnections
between individual and state responsibility for international crimes in part because
individuals and states can be held responsible for the same acts in different tribunals
or mechanisms).
71. See Permanent Representative of Algeria to the UNSC, Identical Letters
dates 12 December 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security
Council, annex, U.N. Doc. A/55/686-S/2000/1183 (Dec. 12, 2000); see also EritreaEthiopia Claims Commission, PERM. CT. ARB., https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/71/ (last
visited Apr. 5, 2020) (explaining the context surrounding the establishment of the
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission).
72. Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, supra note 70.
73. Partial Award: Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims –
Eritrea’s Claims (Eri. v. Eth.), 26 R.I.A.A. 291, 328 (Eri.–Eth. Claims Comm’n
2005).
74. Id. at 330.
75. Protocol I, supra note 34, 1125 U.N.T.S at 27–8.
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reservoir in Harsile, Eritrea but did not cause any damage.76 In
admitting that it targeted the reservoir, Ethiopia justified the attack by
asserting it believed Eritrea’s military capacity would be restricted by
losing supply of that water.77 Eritrea responded by showing that the
reservoir operated only for civilians and served as the sole source of
water for the surrounding population.78 The Commission found that
the Ethiopian government had to have known that the reservoir served
as a vital water source for the nearby city Assab.79 In admitting to
targeting the water reservoir and the knowledge they must have had
that the reservoir served as a vital water source to civilians, the
Commission found that Ethiopia targeted the reservoir to deprive
civilians of water.80
iii. Actus Reus: Attacks Against Objects Indispensable for the
Survival of a Civilian Population
There are two different avenues to decide whether there is an attack
against an object indispensable to the survival of a civilian population:
the attack is against an object specified in Article 14 of Protocol II or
providing evidence that the object not listed in Article 14 is vital to a
civilian population’s survival.81 Protocol II names a non-exhaustive
list of typical objects targeted for starvation, including “drinking water
installations and supplies and irrigation works.”82 Additionally, the
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission case presents a specific example
of an attack against a water reservoir.83
When it is not within the specific examples of Protocol II, the object
76. Eri. v. Eth., 26 R.I.A.A. at 328.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Junod, supra note 63, at 1458 (“This sentence develops the principle
prohibiting starvation from being used against civilians by pointing out the most
usual ways in which starvation is brought about. By using the word “therefore”
certain acts are emphasized, but the list is not exhaustive.”).
82. Protocol II, supra note 9, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 615 (specifying examples “such
as food stuffs, agricultural areas for the production of food stuffs, crops, livestock,
drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works” and implying that the
list is not exhaustive).
83. See Eri. v. Eth., 26 R.I.A.A. at 328–330.
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must prove to be indispensable to a civilian population’s survival. 84
For water resources, objects indispensable to a civilian population are
those that would deprive that population of access to water.85 The
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission partial award case also used
evidence that showed that the reservoir was a sole vital source of water
for a nearby city in Eritrea.86 Additionally, the Commission
determined that the attack does not have to successfully destroy,
remove, or render useless the object but must simply target that
object.87
iv. Mens Rea: Intent to Starve a Civilian Population as a Method of
Combat
The crux of Article 14 of Protocol II is the intent provision written
into it requiring attacks on indispensable objects to be “for [the]
purpose” of “starvation of civilians as a method of combat.”88
Generally, these objects can be either military or civilian to violate
Article 14 as long as the intent is to starve civilians and the objects are
vital to their survival.89
State intent can be inferred from several factors.90 For example,
when the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission looked at intent in the
partial award case, it determined that Ethiopia intended starvation of
84. See Junod, supra note 63, at 1458 (“‘Objects indispensable to the survival of
the civilian population’ means objects which are of basic importance for the
population from the point of view of providing the means of existence.”).
85. See IHL Database: Rule 54. Attacks Against Objects Indispensable to the
Survival of the Civilian Population, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule54 (last visited Apr. 5, 2020)
(defining objects indispensable to the survival of a civilian population in
international and non-international armed conflicts).
86. Eri. v. Eth., 26 R.I.A.A. at 328.
87. Id. at 330.
88. Protocol II, supra note 9, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 615.
89. See Junod, supra note 63, at 1458 (“The text does not distinguish between
objects intended for the armed forces and those intended for civilians. Except for the
case where supplies are specifically intended as provisions for combatants, it is
prohibited to destroy or attack objects indispensable for survival, even if the
adversary may benefit from them.”).
90. See generally Jens David Ohlin, Targeting and the Concept of Intent, 35
MICH. J. INT’L L. 79, 81–4 (2013) (explaining the variation in determining intent
under international humanitarian law).
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civilians based on three sets of facts: they targeted the water reservoir,
the evidence showed they must have known the target was not military
in nature, and it served as a vital water resource for a nearby city. 91
Additional factors include adherence to the prohibitions and principles
of international humanitarian law, particularly the principle of
distinction, and steps taken to prevent suffering from attacks. 92 The
International Committee for the Red Cross confirms this outlook in its
commentary on Article 14 of Protocol II by asserting that the article is
the only protection available against targeting civilian objects within
non-international armed conflicts under the Protocol.93
A State’s inability to comply with the international humanitarian
law principle of distinction can particularly show intent to harm
civilians.94 While there is no designation of distinction in Protocol II,
the definition in Protocol I has been incorporated into other treaties
following Protocol II that apply to non-international armed conflicts.95
The definition in Protocol I in Article 52(2) designates a military
objective by which States must distinguish as those that will make a
military contribution to the attacking party by offering the party a
military advantage.96 A method for proving failure to distinguish is
91. Eri. v. Eth., 26 R.I.A.A. at 330.
92. Cf. Catriona Murdoch & Wayne Jordash, Clarifying the Contours of the
Crime
of
Starvation,
EJIL:TALK!
(June
27,
2019),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/clarifying-the-contours-of-the-crime-of-starvation/.
93. See Junod, supra note 63, at 1456 (raising the importance of the article in
protecting vital civilian objects).
94. See Ohlin, supra note 89, at 85–6 (describing the direct, yet often
unexpressed, connection between distinction and intent because distinction
inherently requires an understanding of where attacks are directed).
95. See, e.g., Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines,
Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II as amended
on 3 May 1996) annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, 3 May 1996, art. 2(6), May 3,
1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 133, 134 [hereinafter Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices]; Second Protocol to The
Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, art. 1(f), Mar. 26, 1999, 2253 U.N.T.S. 212, 212–13.
96. Protocol I, supra note 34, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 27 (“In so far as objects are
concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature,
location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose
partial or total destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at
the time, offers a definite military advantage.”).
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through the patterns of the attacks.97 For example, the South Africa
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in analyzing the responsibility
of parties to the apartheid in South Africa, saw patterns of atrocities
historically occurred as a State widened the scope of its attack.98 The
Commission found that the patterns of atrocities committed in South
Africa occurred because State policy shifted to allow civilians to
become acceptable targets.99

D. POSSIBLE DEFENSE: A LEGITIMATE PURPOSE FOR ATTACKING
THE OBJECTS
While Article 14 of Protocol II does not address allowable
defenses,100 the omission of these defenses can be juxtaposed to the
existence of allowable exceptions within the equivalent Article 54 of
Protocol I for international armed conflicts.101 The Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) allows for the
interpretation of possible defenses not explicitly written into an article
or treaty.102 Interpretation of treaties under the Vienna Convention
requires a text-centered analysis in light of the treaty’s object and
purpose, and can be put into relevant context.103 Particularly, when
there is ambiguity, Protocol II, as with other humanitarian law treaties,
is meant to be interpreted in favor of civilians as that is the object and
purpose of the treaty.104
Regarding defenses under Protocol I, Article 54 specifically allows
derogation of obligation to the Article in certain conditions.105
Primarily, attacks on objects indispensable for a civilian population’s
survival are not a violation when there is an imperative military
necessity and the territory is within the State’s control, so long as the
97. See TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N OF S. AFR., THE REPORT OF THE
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION VOLUME 5 PRESENTED TO PRESIDENT
NELSON MANDELA ON 29 OCTOBER 1998, 276–77 (2002).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Protocol II, supra note 9, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 615.
101. See Protocol I, supra note 34, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 27–8.
102. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 332, 340 (allowing for context to be considered in interpreting a treaty).
103. Id.
104. Id.; Protocol II, supra note 9, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611.
105. Protocol I, supra note 34, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 27–8.
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purpose is not to starve civilians.106 Adding the adjective “imperative”
to the military necessity requirement severely limits the circumstances
that States can legitimately claim allow them to attack objects
necessary to civilian’s survival under Article 54.107 However, the
objects are legitimate military targets when they provide sustenance
solely for the military or are in direct support of military action when
it cannot be expected to starve civilians.108 Generally, the legitimacy
of the targets allowing for a derogation from Article 54 obligations
relies on the intent of the State and its knowledge of the likelihood of
starvation before its attacks.109 Once the objects are targeted to starve
a civilian population, the legitimacy of the military nature of the object
is inadmissible as a defense.110

III. ANALYSIS
This analysis argues that Saudi Arabia violated Article 14 of
Protocol II, as a party to the protocol, when it attacked water resources
for the purpose of starving civilians in Yemen and can assert no
defenses to remove responsibility. First, there is an assessment of
Saudi Arabia’s violation of Article 14 of Protocol II by analyzing the
necessary elements using the language of the criminal law framework:
a non-international armed conflict, actus reus, and mens rea. 111
Second, it argues that no defense is possible to remove responsibility
for the violation of Article 14 of Protocol II through analyzing the
analogous defenses written into Article 54 of Protocol I.

A. SAUDI ARABIA VIOLATED ARTICLE 14 OF PROTOCOL II BY
ATTACKING WATER RESOURCES VITAL TO YEMENI CIVILIANS
Generally, experts agree that the armed conflict in Yemen qualifies
as a non-international armed conflict, which brings the conflict within
Protocol II obligations.112 Saudi Arabia is obligated under Protocol II
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See discussion supra Part II(B).
112. See HRC Detailed Findings Report, supra note 20, ¶ 46; see also Int’l
Comm’n of Jurists, Bearing the Brunt of War in Yemen: International Law
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because it is a party to the treaty and the location of the conflict,
Yemen, is also a party to it.113 The first necessary analysis for this
obligation is the conflict’s categorization as a non-international armed
conflict, broken into two prongs: separating an armed conflict from an
internal disturbance and separating a non-international armed conflict
from an international armed conflict.114 Second, there is an analysis of
the types of water resources Saudi Arabia has targeted and whether
they are categorized as objects indispensable to the survival of a
Yemeni civilian population, demonstrating the actus reus. Finally, the
section breaks down the various ways Saudi Arabia’s actions may
demonstrate an intent, mens rea, to starve a civilian population as a
method of combat.
i Within the Bounds of Protocol II: Situation in Yemen
Categorized as a Non-International Armed Conflict beyond internal

Violations and Their Impact on the Civilian Population 4–9 (2018) (concluding that
the conflict in Yemen is a non-international armed conflict); Geneva Acad. of Int’l
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, The War Report: Armed Conflicts in 2018
34 (Annyssa Bellal ed., 2019) (counting Yemen among the non-international armed
conflicts in 2018); Waseem Ahmad Qureshi, The Crisis in Yemen: Armed Conflict
and International Law, 45 N.C.J. INT’L LAW 227, 247–48 (2020) (asserting that the
evidence shows the conflict in Yemen does not rise to an international armed
conflict); Haydee Dijkstal, Yemen and the Stockholm Agreement: Background,
Context, and the Significance of the Agreement, AMER. SOC’Y INT’L L. (May 31,
2019),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/23/issue/5/yemen-and-stockholmagreement-background-context-and-significance (explaining why Yemen is a noninternational armed conflict and asserting that this designation is widely accepted).
113. See Saudi Arabia Accession: Switzerland, supra note 37 (showing Saudi
Arabia deposited its accession to Protocol II on Nov. 28, 2001, which entered the
treaty into force for Saudi Arabia on May 28, 2002); Saudi Arabia Accession: ICRC,
supra note 37 (showing Saudi Arabia’s accession to Protocol II on Nov. 28, 2001);
Yemen Accession, supra note 36, 1567 U.N.T.S. 309 (entering Protocol II into force
for Yemen on Dec. 20, 1990). See generally U.N. Charter art. 102 (showing the
obligation of states to report their accession of treaties to the U.N.); Details Page of
Treaty: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol
II),
U.N.T.C.
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002800f3cb8
(last
visited Sept. 25, 2020) (including a list of signatories and parties to the treaty and
showing no report by Saudi Arabia to the U.N. of its accession to Protocol II, which
would be a violation of its obligation under U.N. Charter art. 102).
114. See Protocol II, supra note 9, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611.
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disturbances
In Yemen, the conflict is fought between the State of Yemen and an
internal rebel group, the Houthis, requiring the violence under
Protocol II to rise beyond an internal disturbance.115 Under the Tadić
decision, the violence rises to a level of armed conflict based on the
length of time of fighting, the organization of the non-State group, and
its ability to sustain the fight against the State. 116 The Houthis are
centralized to the point of instituting a shadow government in the
capital, Sanaa, where they increased their power.117 Iran’s military
supply demonstrates funding and support which helped build the
strength of the Houthis to fight as a formidable, and successful,
opponent and raises the conflict above mere “internal disturbances and
tensions.”118 The fighting itself has lasted between the Houthi and
Yemen for about five years, which further proves the Houthi’s ability
to sustain the armed conflict.119 Therefore, the armed conflict in
Yemen easily rises to the level of a non-international armed conflict
because the Houthi rebellion is considered an organized group within
the definition of Protocol II.120
115. See Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, ¶¶1–2 (providing the test necessary to find
an armed conflict); see also HRC Detailed Findings Report, supra note 20, ¶¶ 46–
51 (examining the fighting in Yemen).
116. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, ¶¶ 561, 564–67.
117. See Yemen’s Houthis Form Surprise New Government, CNN (Nov. 29,
2016),
https://www.cnn.com/2016/11/29/middleeast/yemen-houthis-newgovernment/index.html (describing the formation of a Houthi government over its
controlled territory in 2016); see also Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, supra note 111, at 3–
4 (depicting the Houthi takeover of Yemen’s capital, Sanaa in 2014 and their
subsequent rule over the north and banishment of President Hadi).
118. See Protocol II, supra note 9, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611; Int’l Comm’n of Jurists,
supra note 111, at 3 (concluding that the Houthi group is sufficiently organized
based on their ability to take a large territory of Yemen including its capital and the
sophisticated method of warfare used by both sides demonstrates sufficient intensity
of fighting to constitute a non-international armed conflict).
119. See Yemen Crisis: Why is There a War?, BBC NEWS (June 19, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423 (describing the roots of
the conflict, the Houthi separatist movement, and how the Houthis have maintained
territory in Yemen through various waves of fighting and peace negotiations).
120. Protocol II, supra note 9, 1125 U.N.T.S at 611 (asserting that the Protocol
applies to all armed conflict which do not fall within article 1 of Protocol I, which
defines international armed conflicts, and must take place in one of two cases:
between a High Contracting Party’s armed forces and organized group which
“exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out
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ii Foreign State Responsibility Under Protocol II: Saudi Arabia
Acts as a Co-belligerent in the Conflict Supporting the Yemen
Government and Iran Does Not
Additionally, the involvement of Saudi Arabia and allegation of
involvement by Iran raise issues of whether an international armed
conflict exists.121 Saudi Arabia acts on behalf of and in assistance to
Yemen through military operations, primarily airstrikes.122 These
airstrikes, coupled with blockades, make the bulk of Yemen’s military
capacity against the Houthi rebels.123 The internationally recognized
Yemen government, particularly President Hadi, is exiled in Saudi
Arabia.124 The limited international understanding of State
responsibility in this context requires a State to act as a co-belligerent
in which the State conducts military operations in another State’s noninternational armed conflict.125 Saudi Arabia easily meets this bar
because it actively participates in military operations and casualties as
the primary hostile actor against the Houthis.126 Under the United
Nations’ Expert Report on Yemen and the International Committee of
the Red Cross experts’ understanding on Yemen, this makes it a party
sustained and concerted military operations”).
121. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, ¶ 70.
122. See Key Facts About the War in Yemen, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 25, 2018),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/key-facts-war-yemen160607112342462.html (reporting that Saudi Arabian airstrikes have caused almost
two-thirds of reported civilian deaths).
123. See Death from Above: Every Saudi Coalition Air Raid on Yemen, AL
JAZEERA
https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2018/Saudi-Arabia-air-raids-onYemen/index.html (last updated Mar. 25, 2019) (describing Saudi Arabia’s
intervention and aerial campaign in Yemen, including information from the Yemen
Data Project that estimates about two-thirds of the airstrikes have hit non-military or
unknown targets and including the escalation by the Coalition in 2017 by blockading
rebel-held territories including vital ports).
124. See Stephen Kalin & Ghaida Ghantous, Saudi Arabia Struggles to Hold
Yemen Coalition Together as Allies Face Off, REUTERS (Sept. 2, 2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-explainer/saudi-arabiastruggles-to-hold-yemen-coalition-together-as-allies-face-off-idUSKCN1VN0Y9
(exploring the divisions in Hadi’s government because of alleged support by some
for the Houthi rebels and the government’s lack of inclusion of regional voices,
which demonstrates further difficulty for Saudi Arabia to end the fighting).
125. See discussion supra Part II(B)(1)(ii).
126. See Yemen: Events of 2018, supra note 18 (describing how Saudi Arabia
continues its airstrikes regularly with air refueling and intelligence support from the
U.S.).
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of the non-international armed conflict and responsible for its
obligations as a party of Protocol II.127
While Saudi Arabia provides direct support to Yemen by
performing the airstrikes on its behalf,128 Iran does not exercise similar
control over the Houthis that would raise the conflict to State against
State under Protocol I.129 Concrete evidence of Iran’s support of the
Houthis generally relies on the similarity of the design and model of
the weapons Houthis possess to Iranian weaponry.130 However,
supplying or training a military raise issues under U.S. v. Nicaragua
from the ICJ, which decided on very similar facts that the United
States did not exercise effective control and was therefore not
responsible over the rebel group in Nicaragua by equipping, financing,
and training the Contras.131 While Iran is suspected to have had more
control at one point or another in the conflict, the evidence available
does not show that Iran has effective control over the Houthi under
Nicaragua v. U.S. or overall control under the Tadić decision because
there is no evidence Iran provides the Houthis anything more than
weaponry and possibly funding.132 Given that Iran does not have
127. See Protocol II, supra note 9, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611; HRC Detailed Findings
Report, supra note 20, ¶ 50; see also Ferraro, supra note 59, at 584 (describing the
point at which a foreign armed force becomes a party to a non-international armed
conflict: when it acts as a co-belligerent using its armed forces).
128. See Caitlin Foster, Yemen Civil War: Who’s Fighting the Brutal Conflict
that’s Left Millions on the Brink of Famine, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 14, 2019),
https://www.businessinsider.com/yemen-conflict-explained-2019-2
(describing
Saudi Arabia’s escalation of fighting to war in Yemen).
129. See Philippe Sands, Andrew Clapham, & Blinne Ni Ghralaigh, The
Lawfulness of the Authorisation by the United Kingdom of Weapons and Related
Items for Export to Saudi Arabia in the Context of Saudi Arabia’s Military
Intervention in Yemen ¶¶ 2.6–2.9 (2015) (finding no basis that there is an
international armed conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran because evidence of
Iran’s effective control is insufficient).
130. See Elisabeth Kendall, Iran’s Fingerprints in Yemen: Real or Imagined?,
ATLANTIC COUNCIL, 2–4 (2017) (explaining that Iran lacks control over the Houthis
because, in spite of allegations of arming and training them, reports show Houthis
defying Iranian advice).
131. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J., ¶ 115.
132. See Houthis Possess Arms ‘Similar’ to Those Made in Iran: UN Report, AL
JAZEERA (Feb. 1, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/houthis-possessarms-similar-iran-report-200201092310615.html (discussing a U.N. report that
found evidence that Houthis’ weaponry shared similar technical characteristics to
Iranian manufactured weapons, and disclosed evidence that infers but cannot prove
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control over the Houthis, this conflict also cannot rise to an
international armed conflict because Iran is not a State acting as a cobelligerent, so the armed conflict is not a State against State as required
under Article 1 of Protocol II.133
Additionally, an international armed conflict that would raise the
obligations from Protocol II to Protocol I occurs when a non-State
group fights against the State for the purpose of self-determination
when that regime is racist, colonial, or alien in nature.134 The Houthi
rebels are fighting to overthrow and replace Yemen as the legitimate
government of Yemen, rather than separate from Yemen.135 While
Saudi Arabia and its coalition dominate in its military representation
over Yemen’s exiled government and could be argued to be alien, the
Houthi’s purpose to overthrow the government limits another avenue
for trying to raise the conflict to an international armed conflict.136
iii Actus Reus: Airstrikes on Water Resources are Objects
Indispensable to the Survival of Yemen’s Civilian Population
Once the armed conflict falls within the Protocol II definition, a
violation of Article 14 must prove that the party to the conflict, Saudi
Arabia, attacked objects indispensable to a civilian population’s
Iran carried out an attack where the Houthis took credit).
133. Protocol II, supra note 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611.
134. Compare Protocol I, supra note 34, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 7 (asserting that armed
conflicts can be internationalized between a State and non-State group under certain
conditions) with Protocol II, supra note 9, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611 (defining noninternational armed conflict as anything that does not fall within the definition of
international armed conflict under Protocol I that rises to the level of intensity of a
State with a non-State group).
135. See Bruce Riedel, Who Are the Houthis, and Why Are We At War with
Them?,
BROOKINGS
(Dec.
18,
2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/12/18/who-are-the-houthis-andwhy-are-we-at-war-with-them/ (describing the historical existence of the Houthi
before the war, its criticism of President Hadi, and collusion with former President
Saleh to co-opt many from the military to take control of territory from the
government).
136. See Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts,
2nd Sess., 18th mtg. at 153, CDDH/III/SR.18 (Feb. 12, 1975) [hereinafter
Diplomatic Conference SR18] (arguing that Protocol II only concerns rebels trying
to overthrow a government and not self-determination and using that argument to
advocate for a less specific rule, which is now Article 14 of Protocol II).
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survival. Protocol II specifically prohibits attacks against “drinking
water installations and supplies and irrigation works,” while not
limiting other indispensable objects.137 Protocol II and the EritreaEthiopia Claims Commission case present the foundational objects
prohibited from attack in Yemen.138 The Claims Commission case
decided that Ethiopia had violated Article 54 of Protocol I, a similar
provision prohibiting the use of starvation as a weapon by attacking
objects indispensable to a civilian population’s survival.139 In making
that decision, the Claims Commission found that Ethiopia had targeted
a water reservoir in Eritrea that served as a vital water source to a
nearby city.140
Under these rules, the use of Saudi Arabian airstrikes against water
infrastructure, supplies, and vital sources demonstrates acts on objects
indispensable to the survival of a civilian population under Article 14
of Protocol II.141 First, there have been dozens of airstrikes in four
137. Protocol II, supra note 9, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 615.
138. See id.; Eri. v. Eth., 26 R.I.A.A. at 328–30.
139. See Eri. v. Eth., 26 R.I.A.A. at 328–30 (explaining that Ethiopia could not
argue the target was a military objective because Ethiopia would have known that
the water reservoir was a vital source of water for the nearby city). Compare Protocol
II, supra note 9, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 615 with Protocol I, supra note 34, 1125 U.T.S.
at 27–8 (“Protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population: 1. Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited. 2. It is
prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the
survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the
production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies
and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance
value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether
in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.
3. The prohibitions in paragraph 2 shall not apply to such of the objects covered by
it as are used by an adverse Party: (a) as sustenance solely for the members of its
armed forces; or (b) if not as sustenance, then in direct support of military action,
provided, however, that in no event shall actions against these objects be taken which
may be expected to leave the civilian population with such inadequate food or water
as to cause its starvation or force its movement. 4. These objects shall not be made
the object of reprisals. 5. In recognition of the vital requirements of any Party to the
conflict in the defence of its national territory against invasion, derogation from the
prohibitions contained in paragraph 2 may be made by a Party to the conflict within
such territory under its own control where required by imperative military
necessity.”).
140. Eri. v. Eth., 26 R.I.A.A. at 330.
141. See Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Group of Eminent Int’l and Regional
Experts as submitted to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
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years of conflict that hit sources of water, water infrastructure, or water
supplies.142 Specifically, the Yemen Data Project categorized almost
every airstrike from Saudi Arabia since 2015, and the strikes have hit
water tanks and trucks, wells, desalination plants, water pumps, water
projects, water drillers, and some water factories.143 Water tanks,
trucks, pumps, and wells constitute “supplies” of water by granting
access to communities struggling to find access to clean water. 144
Water projects and factories and desalination plants equally serve as
vital installations to provide clean water in Yemen while the cholera
outbreak signals an extreme lack of drinkable water.145 The Yemen
Data Project also did not designate almost any of these targets as
military objects but rather economic objectives.146
These economic objectives are vital to the Yemen civilian
population in light of the extreme need nationwide for drinkable water
in the same way the water reservoir was vital to the nearby city in
Eritrea in the Claims Commission case.147 It was known since the
Situation of Human Rights in Yemen, Including Violations and Abuses Since
September 2014, A/HRC/42/17, ¶ 52 (2019) [hereinafter UN Expert Report] (finding
that several attacks targeted objects indispensable to the survival of a civilian
population in Yemen).
142. Data: Airwar, supra note 7 (categorizing data on Saudi coalition airstrikes,
including the category ‘water & electricity’ that documents attacks on various
sources of water, from sanitation facilities to water tanks and wells).
143. See id.
144. See Protocol II, supra note 9, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 615 (failing to define “water
supply”); see also Dictionary of Water Terms, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV.
https://www.usgs.gov/special-topic/water-science-school/science/dictionary-waterterms?qt-science_center_objects=0#qt-science_center_objects (last visited Sept. 25,
2020) (asserting, under its definition of domestic water use, that “water supply”
includes public water supply and self-service water supply like wells).
145. See
Water,
Sanitation
and
Hygiene,
UNICEF,
https://www.unicef.org/yemen/water-sanitation-and-hygiene (last visited Sept. 25,
2020) (cataloging UNICEF’s support of water supply systems through installations
of water points, tanks, latrines, and more); see also Jim Robbins, As Water Scarcity
Increases, Desalination Plants Are on the Rise, YALE ENV’T 360 (June 11, 2019),
https://e360.yale.edu/features/as-water-scarcity-increases-desalination-plants-areon-the-rise (explaining the vitality of desalination plants when water is known to be
scarce and the growing need for them worldwide).
146. See Data: Airwar, supra note 7 (designating whether the target was military,
economic, or unknown under column ‘Main Category’).
147. See Eri. v. Eth., 26 R.I.A.A. at 328–30; see also Margaret Suter, An Update
on Yemen’s Water Crisis and the Weaponization of Water, ATLANTIC COUNCIL
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conflict’s escalation in 2015 that most of Yemen lacked necessary
food and water resources that slowly grew into near famine.148 The
International Committee of the Red Cross Commentary on Article 14
of Protocol II specifically defines starvation as the act of subjecting
people to famine.149 Saudi Arabia’s blockade also prevented aid from
coming into those areas to provide resources in 2017, making the
water resources attacked such as tanks, wells, and desalination plants
all the more vital for the civilian populations’ survival.150
iv Mens Rea: Saudi Arabia’s Knowledge of the Starvation Crisis,
Failure to Abide by the Principle of Distinction, and the Pattern of
the Airstrikes Demonstrate a State Policy Intending the Starvation of
Civilians as a Method of Combat
A violation of Article 14 of Protocol II also requires an attack on an
object indispensable to the survival of a civilian population to be “for
[the] purpose” of “starvation of civilians as a method of combat.”151
While proving intent is a difficult hurdle, scholarship and limited
casework look at several factors to infer a State’s intent to starve a
civilian population: awareness of the risk that targeting an object or
objects will have on a civilian population; respect for international
humanitarian law prohibitions and principles, particularly distinction
and patterns of armed conflict; and whether the State took steps to
prevent starvation relating to the attack.152 Specifically, in the Eritrea(Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/an-update-onyemen-s-water-crisis-and-the-weaponization-of-water/ (describing how the
destruction of water facilities and fuel shortages cut costs of water trucking which
left about 19.3 million Yemenis without clean water and sanitation, leading to a
cholera outbreak).
148. See 10 million Yemenis ‘One Step Away From Famine’, UN Food Relief
Agency Calls for ‘Unhindered Access’ to Frontline Regions, UN NEWS (Mar. 26,
2019), https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/03/1035501 [hereinafter One Step Away
From Famine] (quoting a UN World Food Programme spokesperson who explained
that there was a thirteen percent increase in food insecurity in Yemen within that
year).
149. See Junod, supra note 63, at 1456.
150. See Yemen: Coalition Blockade Imperils Civilians, supra note 25 (describing
the prevention of humanitarian aid for civilians as part of Saudi Arabia’s strategy for
fighting the Houthis in Yemen).
151. Protocol II, supra note 9, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 615.
152. See Eri. v. Eth., 26 R.I.A.A. at 328–30 (focusing specifically on awareness
of the risks of targeting the water reservoir); Murdoch & Jordash, supra note 91
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Ethiopia Claims Commission partial award case, the Commission
looked at Ethiopia’s attack on a water reservoir and surmised the intent
to starve from three criteria: Ethiopia admitted to targeting the
reservoir, evidence that the water source served as vital for a city of
civilians and Ethiopia had to have known the vitality of the water
source before targeting the reservoir.153
First, like Ethiopia’s attack on the water reservoir,154 Saudi Arabia
had clear present knowledge throughout almost the entire five years of
armed conflict that water resources were highly scarce and all water
resources were vital to Yemeni civilian populations.155 Saudi Arabia’s
targets were generally aimed at Houthi strongholds which included
large cities with starving civilian populations, particularly Taiz and
Hudaydah.156 The starvation crisis and lack of water resources
necessary for survival spread beginning in 2015.157 International
organizations and states chastised Saudi Arabia specifically several
times for its airstrikes’ impact on water resources and starvation
generally.158 Additionally, Saudi Arabia failed to prevent suffering
(applying these criteria to the International Criminal Court’s Rome Statute provision
prohibiting attacks on objects indispensable to a civilian population’s survival).
153. Eri. v. Eth., 26 R.I.A.A. at 328.
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., One Step Away From Famine, supra note 147; Palko Karasz,
85,000 Children in Yemen May Have Died of Starvation, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/world/middleeast/yemen-faminechildren.html; Yemen Facing Largest Famine the World Has Seen for Decades,
Warns
UN
Aid
Chief,
UN
NEWS
(Nov.
9,
2017),
https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/11/570262-yemen-facing-largest-famine-worldhas-seen-decades-warns-un-aid-chief; Emma Graham-Harrison, Yemen Famine
Feared as Starving Children Fight for Lives in Hospital, GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/04/yemen-famine-feared-asstarving-children-fight-for-lives-in-hospital.
156. See Samy Magdy, Database Says 91,600 Killed in Yemen Fighting Since
2015,
A.P.
NEWS
(June
19,
2019),
https://apnews.com/b28a2bdb1b01413689e05a7204e6ea90 (highlighting Ta’iz and
Hodayah as the most violent provinces with the largest instances of civilian
targeting).
157. See Suter, supra note 146 (explaining that the armed conflict’s beginning in
2015 sparked an increase in cholera cases from a decrease in water infrastructure).
158. See HRC Detailed Findings Report, supra note 20, ¶¶ 758–60 (analyzing the
international humanitarian law violations of Saudi Arabia and other parties involved
in the non-international armed conflict in Yemen); see also Editorial Board, Saudis
Try to Starve Yemen into Submission, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2017),
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from such attacks on water resources, which is another factor that can
demonstrate intent to starve civilians,159 because it blocked
humanitarian aid from entering for a period during 2017 of the
fighting.160
Second, the recurrence of such attacks can be indicative of a failure
to distinguish between civilian and military objects reflecting Saudi
Arabia’s intent to starve civilians.161 Distinction, while not specific in
Protocol II, is a principle of international humanitarian law that
requires clear targeting of only military objectives in armed conflict. 162
In Yemen, Saudi Arabia attacked dozens of water resources including
tanks, trucks, water projects, pumps, wells, desalination plants and
sewage plants, almost none of which have been designated military
targets.163 The high number of these non-military, civilian objects
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/16/opinion/saudi-arabia-yemen-famine.html
(describing a United States resolution that denounced targeting Yemeni civilians and
calling for parties to get necessary aid to all who need it); Yemen: Attacks on Water
Facilities, Civilian Infrastructure, Breach ‘Basic Laws of War’ Says UNICEF, UN
NEWS (Aug. 1, 2018), https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/08/1016072 (condemning
ongoing attacks on civilian facilities and services, including water supplies and a
sanitation center).
159. See Murdoch & Jordash, supra note 91 (asserting four factors that can be
used to determine intent to starve a civilian population: awareness of the risk that
actions against an object indispensable to a civilian population’s survival would lead
to starvation; respect for international humanitarian law prohibitions; respect for
positive obligations from international humanitarian law principles; and steps taken
to ameliorate civilian suffering).
160. See Heba Kanso, Factbox: A ‘Never-ending Nightmare’ for Yemenis One
Year Since Blockade, REUTERS (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/usyemen-blockade-factbox/factbox-a-never-ending-nightmare-for-yemenis-one-yearsince-blockade-idUSKCN1NB28C (explaining that in 2017 the Saudi coalition
imposed a blockade along Yemeni ports which resulted in lasting damage to the
civilian population by further depleting food and fuel).
161. See HRC Detailed Findings Report, supra note 20, ¶ 760 (finding that all
parties to the Yemen conflict violated international humanitarian law by targeting
civilian objects, and more proof was necessary to demonstrate intent for violations
of the prohibition against attacks on objects indispensable for the survival of the
civilian population but the recurrence of such attacks can be indicative of the
objective of the attacks).
162. See generally Rule 7. The Principle of Distinction between Civilian Objects
and
Military
Objects,
ICRC,
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule7#Fn_7228635_00007 (last visited Oct. 9, 2020).
163. Data: Airwar, supra note 7 (categorizing and specifying what the target was
and whether it was a military, economic, or unknown target).
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targeted in highly populated areas demonstrates Saudi Arabia’s
inability to abide by the international humanitarian law principle of
distinction.164
Finally, the patterns that occurred throughout Saudi Arabia’s
airstrikes show its policy allowed starvation of civilians as an
acceptable method of combat.165 First, of the five governates where
Saudi Arabia attacked water resources the most,166 Saada, Hudaydah,
Taiz, Hajja, and Sanaa, all but Sanaa have been in an emergency
starvation situation since 2017.167 Second, almost half of the attacks
on water resources between 2015 and 2019 targeted two governates:
Saada and Hudaydah.168 There has been a visible shift from 2015 to
2019 towards these areas as centers of conflict between Saudi Arabia
and the Houthi.169 The pattern connecting main areas of conflict with
attacks on water resources which serve as objects indispensable to a
civilian population170 demonstrates a policy of “starvation of civilians
as a method of combat.”171 Like the South Africa Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, which made legal determinations of
violations during the apartheid, Yemen’s failure to distinguish
between civilians and military objects and targeting of water resources
164. See Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in Yemen, Including
Violations and Abuses Since September 2014: Rep. of UNHCHR Containing the
Findings of the Group of Independent Eminent International and Regional Experts
and a Summary of Technical Assistance Provided by the Office of the High
Commissioner to the National Commission of Inquiry, ¶ 108(a) U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/39/43 (Aug. 17, 2018) (“Individuals in the Government and the coalition,
including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, may have conducted attacks
in violation of the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution that may
amount to war crimes”).
165. See Data: Airwar, supra note 7.
166. See id.
167. See Mapping the Yemen Conflict, supra note 30 (explaining that the worst
affected population in the starvation crisis are the two poorest governates: Taiz and
Hudayduh).
168. See Data: Airwar, supra note 7.
169. See Mapping the Yemen Conflict, supra note 30 (displaying the main areas
of fighting in 2015, 2017, and 2019; showing areas like Taiz remain contested
throughout the four years and other contested areas began more inland in 2015 and
moved north and west toward Hudayduh by 2019).
170. See discussion supra Part III(A)(3).
171. See TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N OF S. AFR., supra note 96, at 276–
77 (analyzing the use of patterns to display State policy); see also discussion supra
Part II(B)(2)(iv).
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in high conflict areas shows a political shift towards starvation as an
acceptable method of combat.172 Saudi Arabia had the knowledge that
water resources were scarce and attacking supplies and installations
would risk civilian starvation, which allows for an inference of intent
to starve civilians.173

B. SAUDI ARABIA CANNOT ASSERT ANY DEFENSE AVAILABLE
UNDER PROTOCOL II BECAUSE IT HAD NO LEGITIMATE PURPOSE
FOR AIRSTRIKES ON WATER RESOURCES IN YEMEN
Under Article 14 of Protocol II, there are no explicit exceptions
allowing Saudi Arabia to derogate from its obligation under this
Article.174 One argument asserts that the purposeful insertion of this
provision in Article 54 and the purposeful omission of defenses in
Article 14 mean that those defenses would not be applicable to the
latter.175 The foundational rules of interpretation under the Vienna
Convention can support this argument because the purpose of Protocol
II is to protect civilians in non-international armed conflicts, rather
than create an agreement between States.176
However, Saudi Arabia may argue that the exceptions written into
Article 54 of Protocol I apply to Article 14 and allow legitimate
purposes for attacking objects indispensable to the survival of a
civilian population: imperative military necessity within territory it
controls, objects solely for the military, or objects serving a direct
military purpose.177 Regardless, Saudi Arabia is unable to assert any
of the exceptions in Article 54 of Protocol I.178
172. See TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N OF S. AFR., supra note 96, at 276
77.
173. See id.; HRC Detailed Findings Report, supra note 20, ¶ 760 (accepting that
the recurrence of airstrikes could infer intent to starve civilians as part of Saudi
Arabia’s policy in Yemen); discussion supra Part III(A)(3).
174. Protocol II, supra note 9, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 615.
175. See Junod, supra note 63, at 1456 ( A form of words whereby it would have
been possible to make an exception in case of imperative military necessity was not
adopted ).
176. Vienna Convention, supra note 101, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340; see also Protocol
II, supra note 9, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611 ( The High Contracting Parties . . .
[e]mphasizing the need to ensure a better protection for the victims of those armed
conflicts . . . [h]ave agreed on the following ).
177. See Protocol I, supra note 34, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 27 8.
178. See id.
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First, the allowance for an imperative military necessity is difficult
to argue for Saudi Arabia because the defense requires control over
the territory attacked.179 For the attacks against water resources, all
airstrikes attacked objects within Yemen’s territory.180 Beyond that,
the Yemen government, which Saudi Arabia is serving in a primary
military role, also does not have control over the area as Saudi Arabia
attacked primarily Houthi controlled territory.181Second, based on the
category of water resources hit, particularly wells, water tanks, and
water projects, these have been designated non-military targets by the
Yemen Data Project, which did not support direct military activity. 182
Finally, the legitimacy of the targets allowing for a derogation from
the obligation under Article 14 relies on the intent of the State and its
knowledge of the likelihood of starvation before its attacks.183
Saudi Arabia’s intent to starve civilians and knowledge that water
resources were vital to civilians’ survival makes it impossible to argue
any of the available defenses.184 Without a defense, the noninternational nature of the conflict, attacks against objects
179. See id.; see also Claude Pilloud et al., Commentary on the Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), in
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 659 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) (describing
imperative military necessity as occurring only in an extreme case).
180. See Mapping the Yemen Conflict, supra note 30 (displaying maps of the
frontlines, key fronts, and Houthi presence in 2015, 2017, and 2019).
181. See October 2019 Yemen Front Lines Map, CRITICAL THREATS (Dec. 2,
2019),
https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/october-2019-yemen-front-linesmap (displaying a map of Houthi and Yemen government aligned territorial control);
see also Alia Chughtai & Faisal Edroos, Yemen Conflict: Who Controls What, AL
JAZEERA
(Mar.
24,
2019),
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2016/08/yemen-conflict-controls160814132104300.html (showing a map of Saudi-backed exiled governmentcontrolled area, Houthi controlled area, and Al Qaeda presence).
182. See Data: Airwar, supra note 7. See generally Diplomatic Conference SR18,
supra note 135 (discussing the reasoning behind Article 14, then titled Article 27
before final approval into Protocol II, where the representative from Ireland asserts
that the total prohibition written into the article serves to prevent derogation under
international humanitarian law principles like proportionality because of the
importance in preventing environmental damage in armed conflict).
183. Protocol I, supra note 34, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 27; Eri. v. Eth., 26 R.I.A.A. at
328–30.
184. See discussion supra at Part III(3–4).
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indispensable for Yemen civilian’s survival, and intent to starve
civilians show Saudi Arabia’s violation of Article 14 of Protocol II as
a party to the treaty.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The analysis above demonstrates the high legal standard necessary
to protect necessary natural resources, where legal accountability
happens only with the intent to starve civilians. Given these
parameters, this Comment describes one practical recommendation for
accountability of Saudi Arabia within the current international legal
regime and a second recommendation which suggests a legal remedy
for better protections in the future. First, this section recommends that
a multi-faceted justice mechanism be put in place in Yemen, which
will investigate crimes against international humanitarian law and
repair damages to victims. Second, this Comment suggests the United
Nations expand protections for natural resources at the core of the
Article 14 violations in Yemen by creating a convention based on the
International Law Commission’s draft principles.

A. AS PART OF A FUTURE PEACE AGREEMENT, THE PARTIES TO IT
SHOULD INCORPORATE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
VIOLATIONS OF PROTOCOL II THROUGH A JUSTICE MECHANISM
As Yemen works through finding an arrangement to end the
violence, the State and its citizens must think towards accountability
for crimes and repairing the damage.185 The complexities of a noninternational armed conflict in which foreign States actively support
or are themselves parties to the conflict makes problem solving
difficult.186 Transitional justice out of conflict tends to require multi185. See ASHI AL-KAHWATI, PEACE IN YEMEN 4–6 (Swed. Inst. of Int’l Affairs,
2019) (describing the historical roots of the current armed conflict in Yemen, as well
as the various failed peace agreements and their faults).
186. Hans-Peter Gasser, Internationalized Non-International Armed Conflicts:
Case Studies of Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Lebanon, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 145, 145
(1983) (“The intervention of foreign armed forces in a non-international armed
conflict poses complex problems in relation to the law of war. This is not surprising,
given that the law of war is based on the distinction between international armed
conflicts and non-international armed conflicts. The set of rules that govern these
two manifestations of organized violence differ greatly from each other.”).
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faceted approaches such as national, hybrid, or international
tribunals,187 truth and reconciliation commissions,188 and reparations
regimes.189 Yemen should utilize a combination of these mechanisms
to bring sustainable conditions for victims and justice for crimes
committed.
For Yemen, accountability for crimes of foreign States is difficult
to prosecute and bring them under the law. 190 A mass claims
commission such as the one between Ethiopia and Eritrea could allow
for a forum to find states like Saudi Arabia in violation of international
law, showing a measure of accountability, while hopefully providing
for reparations for the damage caused.191 Fortunately, a National
Commission of Inquiry in Human Rights Violations in Yemen already
exists, and the agreement could add resources to this effort to train
investigators and build the legal framework to apply in Yemen.192
187. See generally Hortensia D. T. Gutierrez Posse, The Relationship Between
International Humanitarian Law and the International Criminal Tribunals, 88 INT’L
REV. RED CROSS 65, 69 73 (2006) (explaining that tribunals are for the purpose of
individual criminal liability and for State violations look at the command structure
to find government or military leaders responsible).
188. See generally Violence in Twentieth Century Africa: Truth and
Reconciliation
Commissions,
EMORY
SCHOLAR
BLOGS,
https://scholarblogs.emory.edu/violenceinafrica/wiki-round-3-post-colonial/truthand-reconciliation-commissions/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2020) (describing truth and
reconciliation commissions as mechanisms for airing out violations and grievances
as a method of healing rather than strictly punishment).
189. See
generally
Reparations,
ICTJ,
https://www.ictj.org/ourwork/transitional-justice-issues/reparations (describing reparations as a victim
centered approach focused on trying to fix the loss from the violations).
190. See Matthew Lister, The Legitimating Role of Consent in International Law,
11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 663, 683 (2011) ( Given these conditions, parties will enter into
an agreement that binds them only if, by entering this agreement, they expect to be
made better off than they would be without it. ).
191. See Eri. v. Eth., 26 R.I.A.A. at 328 30. But see Lea Brilmayer,
Understanding “IMCCs”: Compensation and Closure in the Formation and
Function of International Mass Claims Commissions, 43 YALE J. INT’L L. 273, 312
13 (2018) (warning that the benefits of international mass claims commissions
depends on the motives of the States coming together, the cohesion with the public’s
interests, and the difficulties created when the commissions prohibits complainants
from redress).
192. See Strengthening the Capacity to Investigate Human Rights Violations in
Yemen, INT’L DEV. LAW ORG. (June 27, 2019), https://www.idlo.int/what-wedo/initiatives/strengthening-capacity-investigate-human-rights-violations-yemen
(describing the organizations work in building the Commission’s capabilities to
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Additionally, truth and reconciliation commissions serve as
platforms for more crimes to come to light because they can
incorporate legal conditions which may prevent prosecution for some
acts.193 The benefits of these commissions are collective healing,
confrontation of perpetrators for crimes, and institutional
responsibility, while not preventing prosecutions for international
crimes such as crimes against humanity and war crimes.194 A truth and
reconciliation commission in Yemen allows for broad, in-depth looks
at the crimes committed, responsibility for those crimes, and should
bring in Saudi Arabia and other States to share information and
evidence when they otherwise would not.
This then requires an effective reparations scheme that can provide
individual and collective compensation and rebuilding. 195 Generally,
Saudi Arabia, as well as all State Parties, is obligated to repair
violations of the nature of Article 14 of Protocol II already, so this
mechanism would help fulfill its obligation in the event it is found to
have violated Article 14.196 By allowing for individuals and groups to
gain economic and political stability, Saudi Arabia and other parties
with responsibility for human rights and humanitarian law violations
can contribute to Yemen’s sustainable development. 197 The
provide better accountability measures in Yemen).
193. See Violence in Twentieth Century Africa: Truth and Reconciliation
Commissions, supra note 187 (explaining the history of using truth and
reconciliation commissions and clarifying that amnesty does not apply to some
crimes).
194. See id. (using Sierra Leone as a case study for the benefits of truth and
reconciliation commissions).
195. See Reparations, supra note 188 (explaining that reparations can serve to
repair damage from direct commission of violations or from the failure to prevent
them).
196. See Factory at Chorzow (Germ. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1927 P.I.C.J. (ser. A) No.
8, at 21 (July 26) (establishing as a principle of international law the obligation of a
State to make reparations for its international law violations); Report of the Int’l Law
Comm’n to the GAOR, at 91, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [1963] 2 Y.B.
Int’l L. Comm’n 76, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) (requiring
under Article 31 that States provide full reparations for internationally wrongful acts
and describes in the commentaries that this is an immediate obligation of a State
once it has breach its responsibility).
197. See Reparations, supra note 188, at 95–107 (describing various ways
reparations can take place such as financial compensation, restoration of civil and
political rights, access to land or health care, reparations for individual victims or
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combination of a reparations regime, claims commission, and truth
and reconciliation commission can help rebuild the worst humanmade humanitarian crisis in Yemen while attaining a level of
accountability for Saudi Arabia which is not likely to happen
otherwise.

B. THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD RECOGNIZE THE NEED TO
EXPAND PROTECTIONS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT DURING ARMED
CONFLICT BY PASSING A CONVENTION
Finally, since Protocol II only protects water resources when it is
attacked to starve civilians, the United Nations should work to pass a
Convention based on the International Law Commission’s draft
principles on the protection of the environment in relation to armed
conflict.198 Particularly, the inclusion of the Martens Clause applied to
the environment would allow for the protection of natural resources to
adapt to changing methods of warfare such as starvation.199
The Martens Clause in the International Law Commission’s draft
principles is an evolution of a clause of the same name originating in
the 1899 Hague Convention and has been rephrased in all four Geneva
Conventions and Protocols I and II, among other international law
documents.200 The Martens Clause creates a State obligation in these
collective reparations addressing the causes and consequences of violations within a
region or State).
198. See generally International Law Commission, Protection of the Environment
in Relation to Armed Conflicts: Text and Titles of the Draft Principles Provisionally
Adopted by the Drafting Committee on First Reading, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.037
(June 6, 2019) (laying out rules into categories: principles of general application,
principles applicable during armed conflict, principles applicable in situations of
occupation, and principles applicable after armed conflict).
199. See id. at 3 (“In cases not covered by international agreements, the
environment remains under the protection and authority of the principles of
international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity
and from the dictates of public conscience.”).
200. See Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land:
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, preamble, July 29,
1899, 32 Stat. 1803 [hereinafter Hague Convention of 1899]; see also Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, art. 63, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, art. 62, Aug.
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention
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treaties to protect civilians and combatants regardless of whether a
written or customary international legal protection exists based on the
“principles of humanity and from the dictates of conscience.”201 By the
adoption of a new convention with a Martens Clause applied to protect
the environment in the same adaptive way, water resources and other
natural resources could be protected before they are used as a weapon
of warfare to starve civilians.202

V. CONCLUSION
As a party to Protocol II, Saudi Arabia is responsible for its
violation of Article 14 of the Protocol for attacking water resources
during Yemen’s armed conflict.203 In targeting water resources, Saudi
Arabia attacked objects indispensable to the survival of a civilian
population.204 The crux of the violation lies in the issue of intent to
starve a civilian population.205 In this case, Saudi Arabia’s failure to
distinguish between civilian and military objects, patterns of its
targeting, and knowledge of the risk of starvation by targeting water
resources demonstrates its intent to use starvation as a method of
combat.206 Saudi Arabia also cannot derogate from its responsibility
by asserting the attacks were intended for a legitimate military

Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 142, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S.
135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 34, 75
U.N.T.S. at 392; Protocol I, supra note 34, 1125 U.N.T.S at 7; Protocol II, supra
note 9, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611.
201. Compare Geneva Convention I, supra note 199, 75 U.N.T.S. at 68, and
Geneva Convention II, supra note 199, 74 U.N.T.S. at 120, and Geneva Convention
III, supra note 199, 75 U.N.T.S. at 242, and Geneva Convention IV, supra note 34,
75 U.N.T.S. at 392, with Protocol I, supra note 34, 1125 U.N.T.S at 7, and Protocol
II, supra note 9, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611 (demonstrating how the Martens Clause has
common elements, namely “principles of humanity” and “dictates of conscience,”
but some of the phrasing has evolved such as removing civilized nations in Protocols
I and II).
202. See Dinah Shelton & Alexandre Kiss, Martens Clause for Environmental
Protection, 30 ENVTL. POL’Y & L. 285, 286 (2000) (arguing that applying the
Martens Clause into environmental humanitarian law would be responsive to
technological and economic changes in society).
203. See supra Part III.
204. See supra Part III(A)(3).
205. See supra Part III(A)(4).
206. See id.
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purpose.207
The conflict in Yemen poses great challenges and conveys the
complexities of protecting civilians and necessary natural resources
under the law of non-international armed conflict.208 To combat this
complexity, any future peace agreement in Yemen should incorporate
an international justice mechanism with jurisdiction over violations
within international criminal, humanitarian, and human rights law by
any party to the conflict.209 However, this will not resolve the high
standard in which the destruction of natural resources are protected in
non-international armed conflict; therefore, the United Nations should
pass a convention on protection of the environment during armed
conflict to protect resources in the future.210

207.
208.
209.
210.

See supra Part III(B).
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part IV(A).
See supra Part IV(C).

